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I. Introduction 
 A great deal of political science literature concerns what exactly 
constitutes “clientelism” and how this concept applies to Mexico and Italy. 
Very little literature exists, however, which examines these countries’ 
histories in light of this problem. Furthermore, none have examined the 
degree to which the legal framework of each of these countries has 
facilitated clientelism. A country’s legal framework can help shape its 
democratization process, and studying the law in two countries which are 
widely regarded as having clientelistic practices can give new insights into 
how democracies consolidate. 
 Section II of this article defines the terms “clientelism” and 
“corruption” and discusses their interrelatedness based on political science 
academic literature. Section III discusses the similarities and differences 
between Italy and Mexico, and highlights why a comparison between the 
two is appropriate. Section IV provides background information 
concerning Mexico’s efforts to become a consolidated democracy, and 
discusses how political corruption has undermined these efforts. Section V 
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shifts this discussion to how corruption affects Mexico in the present day. 
Section VI sets forth Mexico’s legal framework for corruption-related 
offenses. Section VII discusses potential solutions to Mexico’s problems 
with corruption. Section VIII provides information concerning Italy's 
recent electoral history, and its past struggles with clientelism and 
corruption. Section IX focuses on how Italy’s past clientelism has changed 
form, and arguably still affects Italy’s modern political culture. Section X 
provides Italy's legal framework surrounding corruption-related offenses. 
Section XI discusses potential solutions for Italy’s problems with 
corruption. Section XII provides a comprehensive comparison of the 
political and legal framework concerning clientelism and corruption in 
both Italy and Mexico. This article concludes that in order to effect 
meaningful change, Italy and Mexico should enact an exogenous anti-
corruption commission. 
II. Discussion of Terms 
 Clientelism remains an important problem for countries attempting 
to consolidate democracy. Clientelism is a difficult concept to define, and 
encompasses a variety of different practices. However, in every form 
clientelism generally has the following characteristics: 
 
(a) the relationship occurs between actors of 
unequal power and status; 
(b) it is based on the principle of reciprocity; 
that is, it is a self-regulating form of 
interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of 
which depends on the return that each actor 
expects to obtain by rendering goods and 
services to each other and which ceases once 
the expected rewards fail to materialize; 
(c) the relationship is particularistic and 
private, anchored only loosely in public law 
or community norms.”1 
 
 A particularly egregious practice that would constitute clientelism, 
for example, is “the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct 
payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services.”2 
 Corruption is commonly defined as “the misuse of public office for 
private gain.”3 Clientelism and corruption are often linked, as the two 
                                                
1 Derek W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, Clientelism, Patrimonialism and 
Democratic Governance 3 (2002). 
2  Mathew M. Singer, Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship between 
Clientelism and Corruption 5 (2009). 
3 William L. Richter, and Frances Burke, Combating Corruption, Encouraging Ethics: A 
Practical Guide to Management Ethics 89 (2d ed. 2007). 
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concepts share the manipulation of public resources.4 However, the two 
terms are distinguishable. Clientelism is an umbrella term that includes 
different categories. “Authoritarian clientelism” is clientelism kept in 
place by force.5 Jonathan Fox, a Professor at the School of International 
Service, wrote extensively on the definition of clientelism, and on 
clientelism's effect on Mexican political culture. In defining 
“semiclientelism,” he stated that if one could imagine a continuum with 
authoritarian clientelism on one end, and the absence of clientelism on the 
other, the gray areas where outright clientelism has declined but has not 
disappeared could be thought of as semiclientelism.6  Semiclientelism 
should be used to describe regimes in transition from clientelistic 
authoritarianism to pluralist democracy. 7  Governments engaged in 
semiclientelism are more likely than governments engaged in authoritarian 
clientelism to use open, democratic practices, rather than force.8 
 Clientelism stunts the accumulation of social capital because, as 
there is a specialized relationship between the patrons and their clients, 
some actors are inevitably excluded.9 These actors are then not able to 
participate in the process of interaction that would normally result in the 
building of social capital.10 
 Clientelism may also undermine the rule of law.11 The rule of law 
is a key component of democratization, and its absence (or the perception 
of is absence) is likely to have a negative impact on a country's 
governmental efficacy.12  Clientelism also increases the incentives for 
politicians to go through alternative channels to achieve their policy 
interests.13  
 Corruption in government can prove difficult to eliminate. 14 
Corruption also might lower a regime’s popular legitimacy.15 In other 
words, if a nation’s citizens see their elected officials engaging in corrupt 
practices the citizenry is less likely to believe that their officials have their 
best interests in mind.16 A low perception of governmental legitimacy also 
arguably undermines a regime’s stability.17 
                                                
4 Singer, supra note 2, at 2. 
5 Jonathan Fox, How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social 
Capital in Rural Mexico, 24 WORLD DEV. 1089, 1091 (1996). 
6  Id. at 1092. 
7 Id. 
8 John Durston, Building Social Capital in Rural Communities (Where it Doesn't Exist) 
16 (1998). 
9 Id. at 15-16. 
10 Id. 
11 Singer, supra note 2, at 3. 
12 Id. at 10. 
13 Id. at 22. 
14 Id. at 25. 
15 Mitchell Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative 
Study of Four Latin American Countries, 64 J. POL. 408, 413 (2002). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 418. 
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 According to Guillermo O’Donnell, a deceased prominent 
Argentine political scientist, particularism (inside of which he includes 
clientelism)18 “is antagonistic to one of the main aspects of the full 
institutional package of polyarchy: the behavioral, legal, and normative 
distinction between a public and private sphere.”19 Therefore, clientelism 
is inherently incompatible with consolidated democracy because a 
democratic society is supposed to be propelled “not by particularistic 
motives but by universalistic orientations to some version of public 
good.”20 
 Clientelism is problematic for democracy for a number of reasons. 
Clientelism undermines the building of social capital because it slows 
overall economic growth. 21  Building social capital requires social 
programs to benefit the community as a whole in order to efficiently 
distribute public goods.22 Clientelism undermines both the rule of law and 
a nation’s political accountability, and increases incentives for politicians 
to raise revenue through corrupt channels.23 
 As neither Mexico nor Italy use force to keep their clientelistic 
practices in place, neither could accurately be called authoritarian 
clientelism. Mexico could arguably have been classified as authoritarian 
clientelism in the past due to the pervasive influence of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party's (“PRI”) in political culture. However, the PRI’s 
influence has lessened to the point that Mexico could be called 
semiclientelism.24  Though it seems less clear, the DC’s influence on 
Italian culture has waned to the extent that, like Mexico, Italy might also 
occupy the gray area known as semiclientelism. 
III. Selection of Cases 
 Clientelism and corruption often take place in countries with “high 
levels of poverty, weak democratic institutions, short democratic histories, 
and a large state economic presence.”25 Although these traits do not 
generally describe Italy, Mexico does have relatively weak democratic 
institutions, a short democratic history (as the vast majority of its history 
                                                
18 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines particularism as “a political theory that each 
political group has a right to promote its own interests and especially independence 
without regard to the interests of larger groups.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 858 (9th Ed. 1983). In other words particularlism, like clientelism, favors the 
interests of small portions of the population over the population’s interests holistically.   
19  LARRY DIAMOND, MARC F. PLATTNER & PHILIP J. COSTOPOULOS, DEBATES ON 
DEMOCRATIZATION 29 (2010). 
20 Id. 
21 Pak Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON.  66, 68 (2001). 
22 Durston, supra note 8, at 4. 
23 Singer, supra note 2, at 22. 
24 Jonathan Fox, The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from 
Mexico, 46 WORLD POL. 151, 158-159 (1994). 
25 Id. at 2. 
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has been under one party dominance) and a high income disparity.26 Even 
if Mexico does not have a large state economic presence, this has become 
true only recently.27 In contrast, Italy has a low income disparity,28 a fairly 
long democratic history,29 and has adopted neoliberal economics.30 Italy 
does have fairly weak democratic institutions, however. Some of Italy's 
democratic institutions have been compromised by pervasive corruption, 
especially in bureaucratic fields.31 
 Italy and Mexico have been on opposite sides of the spectrum 
throughout most of history. Italy was a colonizing country and Mexico 
was colonized.32 Mexico has maintained its current system of government 
since 1917,33 while Italy has seen numerous transitions.34 Mexico and Italy 
are also in completely different geographic “neighborhoods.”35 To Italy’s 
west are consolidated democracies with low rates of governmental 
corruption, but to its east are former Soviet satellite states with high rates 
of corruption.36 To Mexico’s north are the North American countries, with 
relatively low rates of corruption,37 and to its south are the Latin American 
countries with higher rates of corruption.38 
 However, there are also similarities between the two. Both 
countries are relatively wealthy. Mexico and Italy rank eleventh 
(1,845,000 in millions of USD) and twelfth (1,805,000 in millions of 
USD) in terms of nominal GDPs, respectively.39 Both countries rank low 
on the Corruption Percentage Index, with Italy ranking as the 69th least 
corrupt country and Mexico ranking as the 106th least corrupt.40 These two 
facts taken together put both countries in an interesting position: Mexico is 
                                                
26 Global Peace Index - Gini Coefficient, Visions of Humanity (2007), available at 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/GINI. 
27 See generally PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI GODARD & JOHN WILLIAMSON, AFTER THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 170 (2003). 
28 Global Peace Index - Gini Coefficient, supra note 26. 
29 PAUL GINSBORG, A HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY ITALY 402 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2003). 
30 ANDREA MUEHLEBACH, THE MORAL NEOLIBERAL: WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
ITALY 16 (2012). 
31 See generally M. T. Galanti, Is Italian Bureaucracy Exceptional? Comparing the 
Quality of Southern European Public Administrations, 3 BULL. IT. POL. 5, 26 (2011). 
32 Field Listing: Independence, CIA World Factbook (2014), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088. 
33  Mexico, CIA World Factbook (2014), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html. 
34  Italy, CIA World Factbook (2014), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html. 
35 See generally Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, Transparency International 
(2013), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2013/results. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39  GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), CIA World Factbook (2013), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html. 
40 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, supra note 35. 
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the most corrupt country in North America, and Italy is the most corrupt 
founding member of the EU.41 
 This paper will seek to explain how two countries with different 
histories, geographical locations, and political cultures could share 
significant problems with corruption. 
 
IV. Mexico’s Turbulent Democratic History 
 Mexico under the PRI had the longest-lasting dominant single 
parties in Mexico’s history.42 Although the current Mexican system of 
government has made progress in eliminating the inherent corruption of 
dominant party politics, existing problems with corruption have proved to 
be difficult to eliminate.43 
 As it is not constitutionally permissible for the President to run for 
reelection, the incumbent President was historically allowed to select his 
successor, as the country only had one viable party.44 Though alternative 
parties were allowed to exist, elections were frequently fixed.45 As the 
corruption in the Mexican political system became more widely 
recognized, these alternative parties began gaining momentum. This 
culminated in the election of Vincente Fox, a member of the rival party 
PAN, in 2000.46 
 Latin America had borrowed large quantities of money from 
foreign countries leading up to the 1980’s.47 When the United States 
government attempted to strictly control inflation, it contributed to a Latin 
American recession. 48  This new austerity resulted in general 
dissatisfaction with the current political regimes in Latin American 
countries by their citizens.49 Many countries in the region then adapted the 
Washington Census, which led to a general broadening of democracy, 
albeit with a greater economic disparity.50 Mexico’s entrance into NAFTA 
may also have helped with the country’s democratization process.51 
                                                
41 Id. 
42 Kenneth F. Greene, Dominant Party Strategy and Democratization, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
16, 22 (2008). 
43 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, supra note 35. 
44 STEPHEN D. MORRIS, CORRUPTION & POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 43 (1991). 
45 James A. McCann and Jorge I. Domínguez, Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and 
Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior, 17 
Electoral Studies 483, 484 (1998). 
46 Polity IV County Report 2010, Political Instability Task Force (2010), available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Mexico2010.pdf. 
47 PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI GODARD & JOHN WILLIAMSON, supra note 27, at 21-22. 
48 See generally id. 
49 See generally id. at 22. 
50  Alicia Girón, International Monetary Fund: From Stability to Instability. The 
Washington 
Consensus and Structural Reforms in Latin America, in GLOBALIZATION IN THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, 43, 51-53 (2008). 
51  Mara Steffan, The Political Impact of NAFTA on the Mexican Transition to 
Democracy, 1988-2000, 10 J. INT'L AFFAIRS (2007), available at 
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 Nonetheless, democracy was seen as under assault after the 2006 
Mexican presidential campaign, as both the PRI and Party of Democratic 
Revolution (“PRD”) were widely suspected of committing voter fraud.52 
The degree to which these claims are accurate is debatable, but the civil 
unrest that resulted suggests that Mexico might not yet be a fully 
consolidated democracy. 
 The PRD has begun to show aspects of clientelism, even after the 
PRI lost much of its stranglehold on Mexican politics.53 In 2004, the 
PRD’s party leaders stated publicly that its factionalization54 had led to a 
heightened rivalry in the party.55 According to Tina Hilgers, a Professor at 
Concordia University, the PRD “ally with vendor, taxi, and squatter 
organizations, using the groups’ electoral strength to increase their own 
bargaining power in negotiations for positions and policy direction inside 
the party. In return, they provide preferential treatment to the 
organizations' members.” 56  Hilgers points to the long history of 
clientelism in Mexican politics, Mexico’s poverty, and its prospects of 
political stability as possible reasons why the PRD have successfully 
implemented such tactics.57  
V. Modern Political Corruption in Mexico 
 Extensive corruption exists among the Mexican elite.58 A 2002 
survey determined that the Mexican public’s low perception of legitimacy 
for their government might in part be caused by corruption,59 although 
there was no way to prove direct causality.60 Furthermore, a comparative 
study of four Latin American countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay 
and Bolivia) by Selingson alleges that political corruption does, indeed, 
undermine the perception of legitimacy of government.61 This brings up 
several questions concerning Mexico’s clientelism and its electorate. 
 If political corruption does indeed undermine the people’s idea of 
legitimacy, to what extent does this corruption appear in Mexico? 
Jonathan Fox explored Mexico’s progress in establishing both free and fair 
                                                                                                                     
http://bcjournal.org/volume-10/. 
52 Mark Weisbrot, Irregularities reveal Mexico's election far from fair, The Gaurdian, 
(2012) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/09/irregularities-reveal-mexico-
election-far-from-fair. 
53 Tina Hilgers, Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in 
Comparative Perspective, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 121, 134 (2008). 
54 To “factionalize” means “to split into factions.” “factionalize.” Merriam-Webster.com. 
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/factionalize (2015). 
55 Hilgers, supra note 53, at 132. 
56 Id. at 134. 
57 Id. at 138. 
58  Seligson, supra note 15, at 413-414. 
59 Id. at 413. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 429-431. 
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elections and associational autonomy in the context of their relationship to 
clientelism.62 Fox stated that even though Mexico held elections, it failed 
to meet the threshold for democracy in the 1990s.63 Discussing Mexico’s 
transition to a more semiclientelist government, Fox stated “[W]hile the 
transition from clientelism to semiclientelism may look like a step in the 
direction of responsive government, the erosion of strict controls on voter 
compliance may also increase the incentives for state managers to rely on 
electoral fraud to minimize uncertainty. This may be happening in 
Mexico.”64 Thus, although agents of reform in Mexico may have given the 
appearance of making significant change, they may also have merely 
shifted the avenues through which political corruption might be utilized. 
Increased citizen oversight over the distribution of food, the National 
Solidarity Program aimed at improving the conditions of the poor, and the 
National Indigenous Institute have had mixed success in balancing the 
autonomous and semiclientelist forces within the Mexican government.65 
 Somewhat counter-intuitively, one reason Mexico might have a 
corruption problem is because members of congress and the president are 
prohibited from running for consecutive terms.66 Reforming laws such as 
these might spawn the birth of a new class of “career politicians” who 
would be motivated to keep clean for fear of losing their jobs.67 Changing 
these laws would likely only be a partial fix, however, many countries 
where politicians can run consecutive terms also have high rates of 
corruption. 
VI. Mexican Corruption and the Law 
 Mexico has ratified three anti-corruption conventions: the 
Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption (ICAC), the OECD’s Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).68 
 The OAS provides standards of correct conduct and mechanisms to 
enforce said standards. 69  The convention prohibits bribery (broadly, 
including the discharge of official duties in order to gain any advantage) 
and the official misuse of property.70 The agreement took effect in 1997.71 
                                                
62 Fox, supra note 24, at 152-154. 
63 Id. at 181. 
64 Id. at 160-161 (emphasis in original). 
65 See generally id. at 169-170. 
66 LEE STACY, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 278 (Marshall Cavendash, 2002). 
67  See generally Mathew R. Cleary, Electoral Competition, Participation, and 
Government Responsiveness in Mexico, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 296-297 (2007). 
68 Frederick T. Stocker, SURVEYING MEXICO'S ANTI-CORRUPTION LANDSCAPE 10 (2012). 
69  OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Art. III available at 
http://oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html. 
70 OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Art. VI. 
71 Stocker, supra note 68, at 10. 
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 Member states complying with the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
must have established that bribery of a foreign public official72 and  
money laundering73 are both crimes punishable by law, and provide 
accurate monetary accounting. 74  The Convention also provides for 
extradition between member states.75 
 Italy and Mexico are both members of the UNCAC. 76  The 
UNCAC provides that each member state must “develop and implement or 
maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the 
participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper 
management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency 
and accountability.” 77  Member states are required to develop and 
implement policies which affect these general principles.78 The UNCAC 
also seeks to facilitate public trust through transparency in the 
procurement of government contracts79 and public reporting.80 It requires 
criminal penalties for the following crimes: bribery of national public 
officials, bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public 
international organizations, embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of 
functions, illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of 
property in the private sector, laundering of proceeds of crime, 
concealment, and obstruction of justice.81 The UNAC also provides for 
international cooperation among member states for conducting criminal 
investigations.82 The Mexican Constitution defines “public official” as 
follows: 
(i) persons who have been elected as 
representatives in a public election; 
members of the federal judiciary office, and 
members of the judiciary office of the 
federal district; (ii) officers, employees and 
                                                
72  The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Art. I available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
73  The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Art. VII. 
74  The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Art. VIII. 
75  The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Art. X. 
76 United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 
5 September 2014, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014) available at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
77  United Nations Convention against Corruption, Art. V available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf [herenafter “UNCAC”]. 
78 UNCAC, Art. VI. 
79 UNCAC, Art. IX. 
80 UNCAC, Art. X. 
81 UNCAC, Arts. XV-XXV. 
82 UNCAC, Art. XLIII. 
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in general any person who fills an 
employment position or commission of any 
nature in the federal congress or in the 
legislative congress of the federal district; 
and (iii) public officials of autonomous 
agencies, who shall be responsible for acts 
or omissions featured during their respective 
terms and duties.83 
 
 In 2012, the Mexican Senate approved the Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office.84 The Office has still not been approved by the lower 
house in the Mexican legislature.85 
 Mexico has also adopted a variety of statutes which prohibit 
bribery of domestic foreign officials, including the following: the Federal 
Law on Administrative Accountability of Public Officials (which applies 
to all federal public officials and those who handle public resources), the 
Federal Law on Accountability of Public Officials (which applies to 
executive officials and some judges), the Federal Law on Transparency 
and Access to Government Public Information, the Law on Government 
Acquisitions, Leases and Services, the Law on Government Construction 
and Public Work and Related Services, the Federal Law Against 
Organized Crime and the Federal Criminal Code.86 Additionally, several 
laws require that books kept by corporations be accurate, including the 
Commercial Code, the General Corporation and Partnership Law and the 
Federal Tax Code.87 Article 111 of the Federal Tax Code sets a penalty 
range of 3 months to 3 years imprisonment for those who violate the 
accurate record keeping provisions.88 Bribes are not deductible.89 
 Violations of the Federal Criminal Code can result in fines, 
imprisonment and dismissal of a public official.90 If the bribe does not 
exceed “500 times the annual minimum wage in Mexico City” then the 
term of imprisonment could vary from three months to two years.91 If the 
amount of the bribe exceeds 500 times the annual minimum wage in 
Mexico City then the sentencing range is from two to fourteen years.92 
 These laws will only be applied foreign corporations if the 
following conditions are met:  
                                                
83 Luis Rubio Barnetche, Bertha Alicia Ordaz Aviles and Hector Cuevas Gonzalez, 
Mexico, in ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION 175 (2013). 
84 Stocker, supra note 68, at 11. 
85 Id. 
86 Barnetche, Aviles and Gonzales, supra note 83, at 172. 
87 Id. at 175 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Stocker, supra note 68, at 12. 
91 Id. at 13. 
92 Id. 
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(1) the offender is within Mexican territory or the 
crime has an effect in Mexico... (2) the offender has 
not been tried in the country in which he perpetrated 
the crime; and (3) the crime that is being prosecuted 
is considered a crime in both the foreign country 
and Mexico. 93 
 
 The Federal Anti-Corruption Law for Government Procurement 
applies to a great deal of conduct in its prohibition of bribery, including 
the following conduct: 
 
promising, offering or delivering money or 
any other gift to a public official or to a third 
party in consideration for doing or refraining 
from doing any act that is within such public 
official’s duties or within the duties of 
another public official, for the purposes of 
obtaining or maintaining certain benefits or 
advantages, regardless of whether the money 
or gift is accepted or received, or whether 
the expected result is actually obtained; 
 
promising or offering money or any other 
gift to a third party that may intervene, in 
any way, in the design and drafting of any 
call for a public auction or of any other act 
in connection with a federal public 
contracting procedure; 
undertaking conducts that imply or have the 
purpose or effect of obtaining any unlawful 
benefits or advantages in federal public 
contracting; 
 
intervening personally, but upon behalf of a 
third party that is banned from participating 
in a federal public contracting procedure, for 
purposes of such third party obtaining, 
whether totally or partially, the benefits that 
are embedded in the corresponding contract; 
and 
 
promoting or using influence, economic or 
                                                
93 Id. 
 
 
 
 
12                                   Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                       Vol. XV 
12 
political power, whether real or fictitious, on 
any public official, for purposes of obtaining 
a personal benefit or advantage, or a benefit 
or advantage for a third party, regardless of 
whether there is any acceptance by the 
public official, or whether the expected 
result is actually obtained.94 
 
 In 2012, Mexico adopted the Federal Anti-Corruption in Public 
Procurement Law, which applies to everyone involved with the federal 
government,95 and prevents Mexican individuals and entities from bribing 
foreign public officials.96 Individuals who violate this law face fines from 
$5,000 to $250,000.97 Corporations face fines from $50,000 to $10 million 
and face being disbarred for up to 10 years.98 Companies, however, may 
disclose violations in order to receive lesser penalties.99 
 Individuals may also recover for bribery in tort, under Article 1910 
of Mexico’s Federal Civil Code.100 Though the Ministry of the Public 
Function is currently responsible for the administrative enforcement of 
anti-bribery laws, it has recently been abolished.101 The formation of a 
National Anti-Corruption Commission is being discussed to take its 
place.102 
 Mexico clearly has an established legal framework to deal with 
corruption. Nevertheless, it clear that problems with corruption still exist 
in Mexico, as discussed earlier in this article. It is important to note that 
recently the president of Mexico, Peña Nieto (ironically, a member of the 
PRI) proposed the formation of a National Anti-corruption 
Commission.103 This might be the exogenous actor the government needs 
to destroy existing semiclientelistic channels. If the Commission is 
approved, the degree to which it will be successful, obviously, will be 
contingent upon its ability to keep itself free from outside sources of 
corruption. 
VII. Alleviating Mexican Clientelism 
 Several factors can be antagonistic towards democratic 
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consolidation, including “biased electoral rules, principal-agent problems, 
clientelism, and authoritarian political cultures.”104 These problems may 
potentially be alleviated by promoting an active electorate and fostering 
cooperation of the elites and the Mexican people.105 
 Merely holding elections, of course, does not ensure they are free 
or fair. As long as clientelism in Mexico still exists, the will of the 
Mexican people is more likely to be stifled by the will of the elite. Mathew 
R. Cleary, an assistant professor of political science at Syracuse 
University, operationalized both electoral competition and nonelectoral 
political participation, and asserted that the best way to effectively end 
clientelism in Mexico is through the latter.106 This increased participation 
would include activities such as protests, assemblies and the holding of 
frequent “town hall” style meetings in which a constituency can directly 
meet with their representative to voice their concerns.107 
 Cleary’s research was in response to a popular hypothesis that 
political corruption in Mexico would dissipate if there were more electoral 
competition, and the apparent paradox that corruption remains despite 
increased electoral competition.108 His research suggests the two were not 
as related as previously thought, and that the only way to end such 
practices would entail a great deal of citizen involvement.109 
 However, one of the drawbacks of this approach is that electoral 
participation seems to be directly related to socioeconomic status and 
literacy,110 and so increasing participation in order to improve government 
responsiveness might involve underlying societal changes. In other words, 
if Mexico continues to do well economically then corruption might solve 
itself, because as its median level of income goes up so might electoral 
participation.111 If this were the case, it would seem to coincide with 
modernization theory. 
 
VIII. Italy’s Recent Electoral History 
 Italy has undergone numerous regime changes in its political 
history.112 Italy’s Christian Democracy (DC) became the dominating force 
in politics, with the Italian Communist Party being the DC’s main 
opposition. 113  However, during the late 1950s and ‘60s support for 
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Christian Democrats faded.114 The DC, as a “catch all” party, began to 
shift alliances with other parties to stay in power.115 The DC achieved this 
goal consistently until it lost considerable support in 1994.116 
 In the late 1970s the clientelistic practices of the DC had begun to 
take its toll on the Italian infrastructure.117 Giuseppe Di Palma, a professer 
at the University of California, Berkely, noted that “[p]olitical clientelism 
has built a spider web of partisan alignments and dealings reaching all 
sectors of society.”118 Furthermore, clientelism affected “those connected 
with the building and control of infrastructure, such as welfare, education, 
housing, transportation, communication, cooperatives, and the like.”119 
According to Mario Caciagli, a professor of comparative politics at the 
University of Florence, “In the 1980s the whole Italian system seemed to 
become an enormous clientelistic network.”120 Though the DC finally lost 
its grip on Italy in 1994,121 it should be noted that there is significant elite 
continuity from the DC into the contemporary Italian parties.122 This elite 
continuity could be taken as one reason why clientelism, although not in a 
“party” form, might still exist in Italy today.123 
IX. Italian Governmental Corruption 
 Transparency International has identified several major problem 
areas relating to Italian governmental corruption. 124  First, the Italian 
legislative branch has little independence from the executive branch, 
which enables the executive branch to act without much accountability.125 
Second, regulations concerning political donations are rarely enforced, and 
the public does not have access to records of expenditures by political 
parties.126 Corruption costs Italy €60 billion each year, but only €293 
million is recovered through penalties.127 This is likely because OECD’s 
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statute of limitations period bars many potential claims.128 Additionally, 
Italy does not have an independent anti-corruption authority, and there is 
no dedicated whistleblower legislation in Italy. 129  Transparency 
International also noted, however, that Italy had made some 
improvements, as Italy is considering additional legislation and resources 
for public auditing have improved.130 
 Some have pointed to Italy’s large bureaucracy as an explanatory 
variable for its widespread corruption.131 In Italy, bureaucrats have been 
largely complacent about the problem of government corruption, and in 
many cases are in place because of it.132 Partisan appointments have been 
a major problem in Italy, especially because these appointments are 
sometimes done for personal and partisan gains.133 As an example, Italy, 
in an attempt to purge patronage from its government, requires all 
prospective bureaucratic appointees to pass a civil service examination.134 
However, the lengthy bureaucratic work that goes into the civil service 
requirement meant that politicians could appoint temporary replacements 
intermittently, sometimes over a period of years.135 Additionally, in some 
cases these examinations were fixed.136 Between 1973 and 1990, nearly 60 
percent of Italian civil servants were appointed outside normal 
procedures.137 There have also been reports of Italian patrons exchanging 
jobs for votes.138 
 Interestingly, one likely cause of Italy’s widespread corruption was 
the campaign finance reform laws of 1974.139 When it was no longer 
acceptable for corporations to openly donate to political parties, the 
corruption became internalized – corporations unable to go through legal 
channels to encourage politicians to vote for their interests, had greater 
incentives to form backroom deals with elites.140 Corporations in Italy 
have also demonstrated their willingness to give bribes to public 
officials.141 
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X. Italian Corruption and the Law 
 Italy has adopted a variety of international agreements in order to 
alleviate its problems with corruption. These include the Convention on 
the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU 1997, the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 1997, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime 2000, the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, and the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption 1999.142 The ratification process has begun on Combating 
Corruption in the Private Sector, but it has not been finalized.143 
 The Italian Criminal Code (ICC) provides for fraud, 
misappropriation and similar offenses. 144  Fraud is punishable by 
imprisonment from six months to three years, and is used when more 
specific fraud offenses do not apply.145 Government-contracting fraud is 
punishable by one to five years’ imprisonment.146 The Civil Code provides 
for offenses related to a corporation’s assets, activities and 
communications. 147  Legislative Decree no. 58/1998 provides for the 
offenses of market manipulation and insider trading.148 
 The ICC also prohibits bribery of a public official and persons in 
charge of a public service if he or she “receives a consideration, or accepts 
the promise of, money or other advantages/other things of value, in 
relation to an act of his office.”149 Bribery offenses for domestic officials 
under the ICC span a wide variety of conduct, and include proper bribery, 
bribery for performance of the function, bribery in judicial acts, unlawful 
inducement to give or promise anything of value, trafficking of unlawful 
influences, and instigation to bribery. 150  Until 2002, there were no 
offenses covering bribery of private corporate officers.151 Now, there are 
also bribery offenses pertaining to private corporate officers, managers in 
charge of bookkeeping and ordinary employees. 152  Corporations are 
subject to fines of anywhere from €2,580 to €1.549 million.153 Terms of 
imprisonment for individuals found guilty of bribery range from one to ten 
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years, and vary based on the offense charged.154 
 The ICC also details offenses for money laundering, financing 
terrorists and false accounting.155 Tax offenses under the ICC include 
filing a fraudulent tax return by using false invoices, filing a fraudulent tax 
return by using other fraudulent means, filing a false tax return, failure to 
file a tax return, issuing false invoices, concealment or destruction of 
account books and fraudulent underpayment of tax.156 
 Public prosecutors are responsible for investigating corruption 
charges. 157  In investigating the above-mentioned offenses public 
prosecutors may compel a person to attend an interview, compel the 
production of documents, issue search warrants and seize funds in bank 
accounts. 158  Corporations in which the management commits these 
offenses may be subject to penalties, fines, disqualification and 
confiscation.159 
 Non-criminal regulations that restrict corruption also exist. The 
receipt of gifts by Italian government members and their relatives, Italian 
public administration employees, and employees of state-owned or state-
controlled corporations is restricted.160 
 Italy has comparatively lighter punishments for domestic abuses 
than Mexico. Though some might claim that the key to reducing 
corruption in Italy lies in stiffer penalties for corruption-related offenses, it 
is also possible that the key to reducing corruption in Italy is the more 
proactive enforcement of existing laws. Again, perhaps this could be 
accomplished by establishing a centralized agency through which to deal 
with fraud. 
 If there are to be more stringent regulations established concerning 
fraud, they should be narrow in scope in order to reduce semiclientelism in 
Italy. While reducing bribery among Italian government officials and 
foreign nationals might improve perceptions concerning the rule of law in 
Italy, for example, this would do little to alter Italy’s existing political 
structures. Instead, it might be more efficient to include penalties such as 
permanent disqualification from office for domestic fraud in order to 
reduce semiclientelistic practices. 
 
XI. Alleviating Corruption in Italy 
 Transparency International has a variety of recommendations for 
how Italy can lessen some of its corruption problems, including adopting 
stricter rules governing the conduct of elected officials, revising existing 
statute of limitations periods for corruption-related offenses, introducing 
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an educational program in schools dealing with the causes and 
consequences of corruption and establishing an independent anti-
corruption body.161 
 Apart from the establishment of an exogenous entity to deal with 
its corruption problems, 162  another potential way for Italy to reduce 
corruption is for community organizations and NGOs to organize with the 
purpose of forming a more responsive government.163 
 Perhaps Italy has yet to go completely through an extensive 
consolidation process, and once it has maybe its institutions will be able to 
defend themselves against clientelism. This scenario seems less likely, 
however, as democracy is not necessarily a teleological process. 
XII. Comparing Italy and Mexico 
 For two countries with such stark differences, Mexico and Italy 
both had very strong political parties that were able to take advantage of 
their positions. In Mexico, the system allowed for complete dominance by 
the PRI.164 In Italy, the proportional representation system meant that the 
DC would have to form coalitions with other prominent parties to 
consistently stay in power.165 
 In both Mexico and Italy, the existence of government officials 
with unchecked power led to growth in governmental corruption. PRI-era 
Mexico’s strong executive166 and its consistently PRI-led congress assured 
there was little horizontal accountability to the system.167 This allowed 
patrons to use subversive political channels without being held culpable.168 
Italy’s bureaucracy, too, decreased the necessary horizontal accountability 
to ensure the responsiveness of government.169 Bureaucrats, in many cases 
appointed for party loyalties, look the other way instead of voicing 
complaints against governmental corruption.170 
 Perhaps the most striking similarity between Italy and Mexico is 
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that both countries had a single dominant party for a prolonged period of 
time (or, in Italy, a party that was able to from coalitions to stay 
consistently in the majority). This dominant party then took advantage of 
power, seeking to maximize the likelihood of getting elected outside the 
realm of democracy. Though any attempt to apply this to a larger pattern 
might be extrapolation, as corruption exists without the existence of 
political parties, in both of these instances whenever a single party 
dominated the political process corruption became rampant. 
 Both countries had pervasive, corrupt party systems that abruptly 
came to an end. The PRI, although still active in Mexico, is no longer the 
only viable electoral choice.171 The DC dissolved in 1994, though there is 
some continuity between the DC and modern Italian political parties. 
Mexico has recently made strides away from clientelism. 172  While 
corruption in Italy seems to have stagnated, despite new legislative efforts 
to the contrary.173 The fate of these two nations will help analysts to 
determine the causal relation (if indeed there is one) between dominant 
party systems and the corruption they seem to create. 
XIII. Conclusion 
 Both Mexico and Italy have purged themselves of dominant party 
politics, but the clientelism of the previous administrations seems to have 
become entrenched. In Italy’s case, a major factor seems to be that after 
the DC was dissolved, many of its former members merely switched 
parties. The pervasive corruption in both countries suggests that there need 
to be major institutional changes to make the systems more accountable to 
the electorates. 
 Mexico has become a consolidated democracy only recently, and 
has since made strides toward alleviating its corruption problem. Italy, by 
contrast, has been considered a democracy for a longer time, but its 
corruption problems have endured. Both have made attempts to quash 
their pervasive corruption problems, but have met with mixed success. 
The future of clientelism in both countries is far from certain, but history 
has shown that ending a pervasive corruption problem is difficult. 
 Perhaps the most striking thing about studying the anti-corruption 
legislation of both Italy and Mexico is that both countries have an 
accessible legal framework set up to deal with the issue. Some of these 
laws, of course, were not enacted until after the PRI and DC lost much of 
their power. Still, it appears that in countries struggling with clientelism 
the answer does not lie in crafting additional legislation. Obviously some 
anti-corruption legislation is necessary, but such legislation alone is not 
sufficient. What is missing, rather, is a mechanism to ensure that existing 
legislation is enforced. 
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 Italy’s legislature is currently engaged in talks to establish a 
separate entity to deal with corruption. Such an entity might be necessary 
in order to ensure that any attempts to eliminate corruption come from an 
exogenous source. Mexico currently lacks such an entity as well, although 
the current President of Mexico recently proposed a National Anti-
Corruption Commission. The success of such an anti-corruption agency in 
either country remains to be seen, but the fact that both countries are 
attempting to establish such an entity is an encouraging sign. If Italy and 
Mexico are successful, they will improve their popular legitimacy and 
strengthen their social capital as they continue down a path towards 
healthy democracy. 
